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Perspectives on Radioactive 
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Building, and Societal Vigilance
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Mark Elam, University of Gothenburg, Peter 
Simmons, University of East Anglia, and 
Göran Sundqvist, University of Oslo
Monitoring is now widely seen as a necessary 
part of programmes for the geological dis-
posal of radioactive waste. However, we find 
different perspectives on the nature and role 
of monitoring. Among technical experts it is 
viewed firstly as a matter of performance con-
firmation, a tool for validating the safety case 
underlying repository construction. Among 
concerned citizens we find a view of monitor-
ing as enabling the critical scrutiny of safety, 
an instrument for acknowledging uncertain-
ties and detecting emergent problems in a 
repository. After outlining differing views on 
questions of whether, why, what, where and 
for how long to monitor we discuss monitor-
ing in light of constant vigilance as a technical 
and moral principle of nuclear safety. We sug-
gest that “how much monitoring” and “how 
should it be organised” are societal questions 
and as such need to be broadly discussed.
1 Introduction
Geological disposal of higher activity radioac-
tive waste presents many technical and societal 
challenges, not least because of the timescales 
involved. Research on geological disposal has 
been carried out in different countries for about 
half a century, but only in the past decade or so 
monitoring has become a specific focus of politi-
cal, policy, and research & development activity. 
Monitoring can refer to a range of different ac-
tivities and arrangements, which raises questions 
of what is meant by monitoring and what is its 
purpose. Drawing on research conducted as part 
of an international project, MoDeRn, we explore 
the views of professional experts in the field 
of radioactive waste management and of com-
munity stakeholders on the nature and role of 
monitoring in geological disposal.1We find that 
monitoring has different meanings for different 
people, and that expectations of monitoring dif-
fer between groups in society. We point to a ten-
sion between two perspectives on how to assess 
monitoring. The first we find among technical 
experts, who tend to view monitoring in terms 
of performance confirmation; that is, as a tool for 
validating the repository design concept and its 
construction. The second view we find among 
lay stakeholders, many of whom see monitor-
ing in terms of the critical assessment of safety; 
that is, as a form of surveillance that acknowl-
edges uncertainties and can detect unanticipated 
problems in a repository. We outline the different 
views that we have identified, structured as a se-
ries of questions about whether, why, what, how/
where and for how long to monitor. We conclude 
by considering the role of monitoring in the gov-
ernance of geological disposal and in particular 
in relation to the exercise of societal vigilance.
2 Empirical Data
The findings summarised here are based on sev-
eral data sources: interviews with 18 specialists 
in European radioactive waste management or-
ganisations; observation of technical workshops 
on repository monitoring; workshops involving 
volunteers from communities which host existing 
nuclear facilities who have had varying degrees 
of engagement with radioactive waste manage-
ment projects in Belgium, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom; a visit to two underground research 
laboratories (URLs) in Switzerland with a subset 
of these volunteers; and an analysis of strategic 
and technical documents on repository monitor-
ing. Where possible, interviews and group dis-
cussions were recorded and fully transcribed to 
facilitate analysis. Interpretation of the results 
was supported by reference to relevant research 
literature. The analysis cannot claim to provide a 
representative categorisation of views on moni-
toring in relation to geological disposal but can 
provide insight into the understandings, concerns 
and reasoning of experts and affected citizens.
3 Whether and Why to Monitor
One thing on which all of our respondents agreed 
was that monitoring should be an integral part of 
repository development and design.2 Waste man-
agement experts referred to two reports as being 
SCHWERPUNKT
Technikfolgenabschätzung – Theorie und Praxis 21. Jg., Heft 3, Dezember 2012  Seite 23
decisive in the way their community looks at 
monitoring today. The first of these is an Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Technical 
Document on monitoring of geological repositor-
ies for high-level radioactive waste (IAEA 2001). 
In this report we find the first explicit definition of 
monitoring for geological disposal.3 The second 
is the report of a European Thematic Network 
(ETN) on the role of monitoring in a phased ap-
proach to the geological disposal of radioactive 
waste (EC 2004). The structural integration of 
monitoring activities into the geological disposal 
process is therefore a relatively recent develop-
ment. This has been marked by the inclusion of 
requirements relating to repository monitoring 
strategies in an IAEA Safety Standards document 
(IAEA 2006). This document states that safety 
should be ensured “by passive means inherent in 
the characteristics of the site and the facility and 
those of the waste packages” (IAEA 2006, p. 4), 
and should not depend upon monitoring and ac-
tive management. The IAEA nevertheless envis-
ages a contributory role for monitoring to support 
progress to the goal of passive safety.
The IAEA and the ETN reports give multi-
ple reasons for monitoring a geological reposi-
tory. These can be summarised as: (a) monitoring 
can enhance understanding of the behaviour of 
the repository system and its environment, (b) of-
fer confirmation of the disposal concept, and thus 
(c) provide information on the repository system 
for purposes of decision-making now and in the 
future, thereby supporting a stepwise implemen-
tation of geological disposal. The IAEA Safety 
Standards document also refers to its role in con-
firming the conditions for operational and post-
closure safety, thereby supplying an evidence base 
for decision-making at each stage (IAEA 2006). 
In addition, it is explicitly assumed that monitor-
ing can support “public confidence” (IAEA 2001; 
EC 2004) or social or public “acceptance” (e.g. 
IAEA 2006)4. Providing assurance was explicitly 
mentioned by all of the technical specialists inter-
viewed as one of the main drivers for monitoring, 
with distinctions being drawn between three dif-
ferent ways in which this is done:
 • monitoring as a tool for performance assess-
ment and quality assurance for the designer, 
modeller, implementer – providing data to 
verify both the repository system and the 
modelling behind it;
 • monitoring as a way of demonstrating that the 
repository programme has successfully incor-
porated specific societal expectations by be-
ing compliant with regulatory requirements, 
thereby providing assurance to regulators, 
particularly in relation to operational safety 
and environmental impact assessment;
 • monitoring as a means to build public con-
fidence both by responding to (potentially 
changing) public demands for transparency 
and oversight of repository development and 
staged closure.
The potential role of monitoring in public confi-
dence building was echoed in the workshops with 
local stakeholders in Belgium, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom (UK). The Belgian group, for 
example, came to the conclusion that confidence 
building and “keeping guard” over the safety of 
the facility were the main reasons for monitor-
ing.5 The UK group also identified stakeholder 
confidence in the safety of the repository as one 
of three reasons to monitor, the others being veri-
fication of compliance with regulations or stand-
ards, and “quality control” to support continuous 
improvement.6 Informing both the Belgian view 
on keeping guard and UK views on verification 
of continued safety is a notion of maintaining 
watch over the repository, something to which 
we return below. Confidence building through 
compliance monitoring and quality control thus 
seems to be the key reasons for monitoring put 
forward by implementers, regulators and citi-
zens. However, some subtle but significant dif-
ferences can be detected between the viewpoints 
of these different actors.
One important difference is the emphasis 
put by regulators and implementers and their 
monitoring experts on performance confirma-
tion, while citizens tended to emphasise quality 
control and checking expected behaviour. This 
difference is particularly evident where the ques-
tion of long-term safety is concerned.
During a workshop with implementers and 
regulators,7 it was stressed several times that the 
focus should be on performance confirmation, 
and not on checking performance (see Harvey/
White 2011). Because these actors rely heavily on 
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the safety case as the principal method for dem-
onstrating confidence in the safety of the disposal 
system, they consider the checks on whether or 
not the system provides adequate safety to come 
from the development of the repository design, 
and from the site selection and site characterisa-
tion activities. Obtaining a licence for construct-
ing and operating a repository, they argued, is 
proof of a high degree of confidence in the safe 
performance of a repository, and hence “there 
would not be reliance on monitoring as a basis 
for ensuring safety” (recorded in Harvey/White 
2011, p. 18, emphasis added). In other words, 
monitoring must be dedicated to progressively re-
ducing the need to repeatedly check on safety, to 
verifying the needlessness of continuing to look.
From accounts of the relationship between 
stakeholders and monitoring activities in the 
nuclear field published by the Nuclear Energy 
Agency and others, however, it seems clear that 
in many situations stakeholders expect a more 
critical assessment of safety, reflecting social 
science research on risk and trust (e.g. Giddens 
1991; Simmons/Wynne 1993; Irwin 2008). They 
require not only operator and expert assurance 
of safety, but also the assurance of (independ-
ent) monitoring for any evidence of exposure to 
harmful releases. They may not expect monitor-
ing to contribute to the safety of a facility, but do 
expect it to check that safety is ensured.
The only “lay” participant in the workshop 
referred to above observed that the focus on con-
firmation, rather than on checking, of expected 
behaviour appeared “rather arrogant, since the 
system might not perform as expected”, pointing 
out that “implementers should not assume that 
monitoring will only confirm their expectations” 
(cited in Harvey/White 2011, p. 18). Similar argu-
ments were made by participants in the Belgian, 
Swedish and UK workshops with community 
stakeholders. When the term ‚performance con-
firmation‘ was used in a presentation by a waste 
management organisation representative it was 
questioned by the Belgian group, as participants 
considered it inappropriate to take as a starting 
point the assumption that no problems can occur 
in future. They pointed out that in geological dis-
posal one will never be completely certain that all 
will go well in future before starting implementa-
tion.8 Monitoring was thus considered necessary 
to remain on guard, but was only seen as effec-
tive if accompanied by a response plan or what 
UK stakeholders referred to as a “Plan B” should 
anything unexpected be detected.9 This raised the 
concern that designing monitoring programmes 
for performance confirmation is likely to lead to 
implementers prioritizing different measures to 
those which might be most appropriate for regis-
tering less likely or unexpected events.
4 What, Where and How to Monitor?
The IAEA and ETN documents identify a number 
of different types of monitoring, relating to: occu-
pational health and safety during the operational 
phase; protection of the surrounding environ-
ment; performance confirmation and staged deci-
sion-making; and prevention of nuclear prolifera-
tion (EC 2004; IAEA 2001; IAEA 2006). From 
an implementer’s perspective, monitoring the 
behaviour of the repository system from within 
the repository itself, for the purpose of verifying 
design elements supporting the long-term safety 
of the facility, is especially desirable during the 
phase of construction and operation, when chang-
es in the design remain possible. It does, however, 
present two important challenges.
The first challenge is to identify processes 
that can be measured in the relatively short pe-
riod before closure and which would conclu-
sively confirm the basis for predictions of (very) 
long-term system behaviour. Although discus-
sion continues about which parameters should 
be measured, the following aspects can be noted. 
The position taken by the technical specialists in-
terviewed was that it will be possible to identify 
measurable parameters that would enable them 
to validate (and if need be calibrate) the models 
on which they build their safety cases. But for 
both technical and financial reasons the param-
eters selected are likely to be few in number.
The second challenge is how to organise 
such monitoring without compromising funda-
mental safety barriers. This is an issue during the 
stages before closure but is seen as particularly 
problematic after (partial) closure of the facility. 
Hence, they are investigating options for non-
intrusive techniques, such as wireless sensor net-
works and wireless through-the-earth data trans-
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mission, fibre-optic technologies and geophysical 
techniques, monitoring of groundwater chemis-
try, geotechnical monitoring, and aerial or satel-
lite-based monitoring. Although some of these 
techniques look promising, several require much 
further research to adapt them to the requirements 
of repository monitoring (White et al. 2010).
From our interviews, it seems that there is a 
widely held perception in the expert community 
that public and stakeholder expectations were like-
ly to focus on environmental monitoring to protect 
against human health impacts. A review of litera-
ture on citizen and stakeholder engagement with 
monitoring seems to corroborate this perception, 
as most of the activities reported involved some 
sort of environmental monitoring. In several cases 
monitoring was commissioned or conducted by 
local institutional stakeholders, particularly local 
government, including in some cases monitoring 
of the socioeconomic environment (e.g. Conway 
et al. 2009). Dissatisfaction with or distrust of in-
stitutions also led members of some communities 
to demand or initiate participatory environmental 
monitoring, involving citizens in data collection 
(e.g. Vári/Ferencz 2007; NEA 2009). In the field 
of radioactive waste and other nuclear industry 
facilities, there is considerable evidence of stake-
holder and citizen involvement in facility moni-
toring activities (e.g. NEA 2003; NEA 2010). This 
demonstrates the desire of citizens and communi-
ties in many different contexts for active engage-
ment with facility monitoring programmes.
From our own engagement exercises, we 
learned that local citizens were generally less con-
cerned about which parameters or at which exact 
location to monitor. What they insisted upon was 
that a monitoring programme for geological dis-
posal should be as comprehensive as possible, 
including both near-field and far-field monitor-
ing, as well as the socioeconomic environment. 
Both the Belgian and UK groups acknowledged 
a tension between potentially intrusive near-field 
monitoring and the integrity of barriers and seals. 
It was also considered important, notably by the 
Belgian group, to continue searching for alter-
native techniques or parameters for repository 
processes that would be difficult to monitor with 
current technology, and to consider laboratory 
simulations as substitutes for near-field moni-
toring (e.g. in a post-closure situation).10 On the 
other hand, this question of monitoring processes 
in underground laboratories or pilot facilities dur-
ing repository development to reduce the need for 
directly monitoring the repository during imple-
mentation also raised some concerns about the 
need “to know what happens in reality” and was 
questioned in the Swedish discussions. 11
5 How Long to Monitor?
On the question of how long to monitor, techni-
cal specialists and concerned citizens again tend-
ed to differ. Post-closure monitoring was consid-
ered by experts to be technically unnecessary, as 
they did not expect anything to be detected once 
closure had ensured passive safety. For them, 
monitoring is dedicated to confirming that the 
conditions outlined in the regulatory safety case 
have been achieved and to supporting repository 
closure. Post-closure near-field monitoring in 
particular was said by many of them to be un-
realistic and even potentially counterproductive 
insofar as the techniques used might contribute 
to compromising barrier integrity. Nevertheless, 
many experts interviewed accepted that there 
could be value in post-closure monitoring if 
it served to reassure others, such as local com-
munities – a position also expressed in techni-
cal guidance documents (e.g. IAEA 2006). It was 
noted by some of our interviewees that although 
there may be currently little evidence of statutory 
requirements for post-closure monitoring for rea-
sons of radiological protection, it seemed likely 
that they would be introduced in some countries 
in the future in response to societal demands.
Evidence from the Belgian, Swedish and 
UK workshops confirmed that many engaged cit-
izens do have expectations and concerns regard-
ing post-closure monitoring, and are unlikely to 
let the issue be ignored. Less clear was the type 
of monitoring (near-field, far-field or surface en-
vironment) they would expect in the post-closure 
period. In the Swedish workshop it was pointed 
out that even if post-closure monitoring is con-
sidered desirable, the necessary technological 
innovation is unlikely to happen without the pur-
poseful allocation of funds to research and devel-
opment. Community stakeholders were therefore 
concerned about post-closure safety but, unlike 
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the technical experts, tended to see continued 
monitoring of some sort as necessary not merely 
to confirm that the evolution of the repository 
system conforms to technical expectations but to 
ensure that it continues to do so and is not af-
fected by unanticipated events or evolutions, a 
concern to which we return in our final section.
6 Monitoring and (Risk) Governance 
What is the role of monitoring in (risk) governance 
of geological repositories? One of the key princi-
ples informing the management and regulation of 
nuclear safety is that of constant surveillance. This 
is firstly a political and moral principle, and it ex-
presses what societies interpret nuclear safety to 
mean. Monitoring programmes are therefore ways 
of putting the moral principle of tireless vigilance 
into technical practice. This is particularly the case 
for nuclear installations such as power plants, re-
processing plants and storage facilities, as pointed 
out by nuclear scientist Alvin Weinberg when he 
referred to the unusual degree of vigilance which 
had to be exercised over programmes of nuclear 
power generation during the entire course of their 
development in order to guarantee safety (Wein-
berg 1972). Geological repositories, incorporating 
the technical – and moral – principle of passive 
safety, can be understood as a way to renegotiate 
the need for unremitting vigilance by delegating 
responsibility for safety to an engineered geologi-
cal disposal system. Weinberg believed that effec-
tive geological disposal reduced the need for vigi-
lance to a minimum, in line with current expert 
thinking that all that will be needed of society to 
ensure safety is surveillance to avoid intentional 
or unintentional human intrusion into the reposi-
tory system.12 However, our exploratory engage-
ment with community stakeholders from three 
European countries suggests that more is expected 
by many citizens.
These are, as Weinberg reminds us, societal 
questions that cannot be answered from a techni-
cal-expert perspective alone (Weinberg 1972). So-
ciety will have to decide what kind of human vigi-
lance is needed and for how long it should con-
tinue. Nevertheless, to relinquish direct control of 
the wastes will require societal confidence in the 
repository system and trust in those responsible 
for designing, implementing, overseeing and reg-
ulating it. It may therefore be easier for national 
and local decision-makers – and the communities 
they represent – to commit to taking successive 
steps in repository siting, development, licensing, 
construction and operation if the contingent nature 
of their trust and commitment13 at each and every 
stage is acknowledged and the opportunity to re-
evaluate or even veto plans is upheld.
In addition to providing confirmation of 
the models upon which the safety case is based, 
therefore, there is another way in which moni-
toring can support public confidence. This is by 
helping to demonstrate that the implementer of 
a disposal programme recognises that there are 
systemic uncertainties and is taking a precau-
tionary approach,14 although this potential role of 
monitoring was not emphasised explicitly in our 
workshops. Such open acknowledgement of un-
certainty is not without its risks, in that it may ap-
pear to bring into question the premise of passive 
safety as the technological solution to the socio-
technical problem of guaranteeing unflagging 
vigilance over long-lived high-level radioactive 
waste. By introducing the notion of retrievability 
or reversibility into law, however, countries such 
as Switzerland and France are already moving 
towards an adapted socio-technical solution one 
still directed towards achieving passive safety, 
but which recognises that this end point may be 
further away than initially envisaged, subject to a 
longer chain of socio-technical decision-making, 
and may not be final.15 This reminds us that we 
may inevitably pass the burden of decision about 
final closure to subsequent generations. Ac-
knowledging this demands that we think specifi-
cally about the type of information, knowledge 
and skills that need to be passed on to future gen-
erations, and the role that monitoring might play 
in meeting the needs of future operators, regula-
tors, decision-makers and affected citizens.
Notes
1) A full description of the project and copies of 
published reports cited here can be found at: 
http://www.modern-fp7.eu/home/.
2) There are nevertheless evident national differences 
in the attention given to monitoring by radioactive 
waste management organisations and regulators, 
a point to which we return further on in this pa-
per. This is often associated with different disposal 
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concepts: in France, for example, where reversibil-
ity has become a policy requirement, monitoring 
has been the focus of research and development, 
whereas in Sweden, where the proposed concept 
does not envisage retrievability of wastes, moni-
toring is not viewed as the same challenge.
3) Monitoring is defined here as “...continuous or 
periodic observations and measurements of en-
gineering, environmental or radiological param-
eters, to help evaluate the behaviour of compo-
nents of the repository system, or the impacts of 
the repository and its operation on the environ-
ment”. (IAEA 2001, p. 1)
4) In this last document, the role of monitoring for 
social or public acceptability is particularly linked 
to the question of post-closure safety.
5) MoDeRn Exploratory Engagement Exercise, 
Mol, Belgium, December 15, 2011.
6) MoDeRn Exploratory Engagement Exercise, Bir-
mingham, UK, April 19, 2012.
7) MoDeRn Expert Stakeholder Workshop, Oxford, 
UK, May 4–5, 2011.
8) MoDeRn Exploratory Engagement Exercise, 
Mol, Belgium, February 2, 2012.
9) MoDeRn Exploratory Engagement Exercise, 
Mol, Belgium, December 15, 2011; Birmingham, 
UK, April 19, 2012.
10) MoDeRn Exploratory Engagement Exercise, 
Mol, Belgium, May 24, 2012.
11) MoDeRn Exploratory Engagement Exercise, 
Östhammar, Sweden, March 16, 2012.
12) International guidelines require external safe-
guards monitoring of human access in order to 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials 
(IAEA 2001).
13) On the provisional nature of social trust see, for 
example, Lewis/Weigert 1985; Giddens 1991; 
Jones/George 1998.
14) On uncertainty, precaution and the governance of 
technology see, for example, Stirling 2006.
15) For a discussion of the adoption of the principle 
of reversibility in French radioactive waste policy 
see Barthe 2009.
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« »
Monitoring im Endlager: 
notwendig für die Akzeptanz?
Anmerkungen aus Sicht eines 
Betreibers von Zwischenlagern
von Hannes Wimmer, Klaus-Jürgen Brammer 
und Michael Köbl, Gesellschaft für Nuklear-
Service, Essen
Das Monitoring eines Endlagers kann im 
Sinne der Internationalen Atomenergie-Or-
ganisation (IAEA) als vertrauensbildende 
Maßnahme verstanden werden, die in ei-
nem definierten Zeitraum während und nach 
der Betriebsphase durchgeführt wird. Er-
ste Erfahrungen mit Monitoring wurden in 
Deutschland bereits bei den bestehenden 
Zwischenlagern gemacht. Basierend auf die-
sen Erfahrungen werden hier aus Sicht eines 
Nukleardienstleisters Randbedingungen und 
Möglichkeiten des Monitorings eines Endla-
gers aufgezeigt und der mögliche Beitrag von 
Monitoring zur gesellschaftlichen Akzeptanz 
eines Endlagers diskutiert.
1 Einführung
Die zentrale Aufgabe eines Endlagers für radio-
aktive Abfälle in tiefen geologischen Forma-
tionen ist es, Radionuklide dauerhaft von den 
Stoffkreisläufen zu isolieren. Den nachfolgenden 
Generationen sollen dabei keine Lasten aufgebür-
det werden, d. h. das Endlager soll wartungs- und 
überwachungsfrei funktionieren. Ein Endlager-
system für hochradioaktive Abfälle ist nur dann 
genehmigungsfähig, wenn in einem Langzeit-
sicherheitsnachweis gezeigt werden kann, dass 
diese Ziele mindestens für den regulatorisch 
geforderten Nachweiszeitraum erreicht werden. 
In Deutschland sind das eine Million Jahre, also 
ein weitaus längerer Zeitraum als der, der seit der 
letzten Eiszeit vergangen ist. Ob sich das End-
lagersystem bzw. die einzelnen Komponenten 
des Systems in der erwarteten Weise entwickeln, 
kann durch ein Monitoring geprüft werden. Die 
Internationale Atomenergie-Organisation (IAEA) 
definiert Monitoring als „continuous or periodic 
observations and measurements of environmen-
tal, engineering, or radiological parameters to 
